RELIGIOSITY, DISCRIMINATION AND GROUP IDENTITY AMONG MUSLIM AMERICANS

Matt Barreto, Natalie Masuoka, Gabriel Sanchez

Abstract

Recently there has been a resurgence in the interest of group consciousness and linked fate among political scientists, especially as they relate to diverse racial and ethnic groups such as Latinos and Asian Americans. In this paper we extend this analysis to a new minority population: Muslim Americans. While Muslim Americans are among the most discussed and debated social groups in the United States, they are among the least studied from an empirical research perspective. On the one hand, political observers argue that a unified Muslim community exists, but at the same time, many note that Muslims are too diverse to be considered a cohesive group. Despite competing claims, these empirical questions have not been answered by social scientists. Using a unique public opinion survey of Muslim Americans, we examine the degree of group consciousness among this religious/ethnic minority group. Specifically, we test whether or not perceptions of discrimination, degree of religiosity, and linguistic diversity create a sense of group commonality among Muslim Americans. This paper represents one of the first efforts to understand whether or not Muslims are a cohesive political community in America, and what factors contribute or detract from group identity.

Paper Presented at the WPSA Annual Conference, March 2008

Religiosity, Discrimination and Group Identity Among Muslim Americans

Introduction

With an estimated population of seven million in the United States,[1] Muslim Americans constitute a growing and increasingly important segment of U.S. society. Yet there is surprisingly little quantitative research focused on the general political attitudes and opinions of this segment of the population. This limitation is at least partially due to the tremendous diversity of the Muslim population in the United States. Muslims Americans come from at least 40 countries of origin, most having different traditions, languages, and political beliefs. Further, although largely comprised of immigrants, a significant segment of the Muslim population is native born (mostly African American) who have converted to Islam. These factors contribute to the Muslim population being arguably the most diverse social "group" in the United States. Despite this tremendous variation, it is possible that common experiences with discrimination, feelings of alienation from government in the United States, and shared religiosity lead to the formation of group identity for this population similar to other diverse pan-ethnic communities such as Asians or Latinos. It is here where we focus our attention, investigating the presence and contributing factors of linked fate for the Muslim American population.

Group consciousness, in its many forms, has long been a key feature in studies interested in the political behavior of racial and ethnic populations. In particular, group consciousness has been especially important in explaining the political behavior of

---

[1] Determining the number of Muslims in the United States is complicated by their tremendous diversity and by the fact that the U.S. Census as a matter of policy does not ask about religions affiliations in its national surveys.

African Americans (Dawson 1994; Tate 1993). More recent studies have explored the presence and impact of group consciousness among the Latino and Asian American communities in the United States (Kaufmann 2003; J. Garcia, 2000; Manzano & Sanchez 2006; Masuoka 2006; Sanchez 2006a Sanchez 2006b Stokes 2003). Although the application of group identity to the Latino and Asian American populations has provided a deeper understanding of this concept, the Muslim American population has remained virtually ignored in political science research (but see Jamal 2005).

Given the tremendous diversity of Muslim Americans in the United States, we contend that this may be the most unlikely case in which to find evidence of strong shared group consciousness. Using a unique public opinion survey of Muslim Americans, we examine the degree to which group consciousness is formulated among a religiously-defined minority group. Specifically, we test whether or not perceptions of discrimination, religiosity, and language create a sense of group commonality among Muslim Americans. Our investigation of the presence of linked fate among Muslim Americans will not only contribute to our knowledge of this increasingly important population, but also to our working knowledge of the many facets of group identity.

Group Consciousness and Political Behavior

Scholars of political behavior have examined group consciousness for some time, finding evidence that the concept leads to many positive political outcomes for racial and ethnic groups. Specifically, previous research has suggested that group consciousness leads to increased political participation (Dawson 1994; Miller et. al 1981; Stokes 2003; Sanchez 2006a; Tate 1994), greater support for coalitions with other racial/ethnic groups

(J. Garcia 2000; Kaufmann 2003; Sanchez 2008; Uhlaner 1991), and influences policy preferences (Dawson 1994; Hochschild 1995; Sanchez 2006b) among U.S minority groups. Furthermore, many have argued that group consciousness is a political resource that can help explain relatively high political participation rates among disadvantaged groups (Leighley 2001; Olsen 1965; Verba and Nie 1972).

Group consciousness is defined as instances when a group maintains a sense of affinity and group identification with other members of the group, which leads to a collective orientation to become more politically active (J. Garcia 2003). Further, as Miller et al. (1981) posit, group consciousness must encompass both group identification and the perception that the group's lower status could be remedied by the state. Perceptions of group commonality is therefore the first dimension of group consciousness, and as a result is often employed as either a primary measure of group consciousness (Masuoka 2006; Olson 1965; Verba and Nie 1972), or as one of several measures tapping into the multi-dimensional concept (Sanchez 2006a; 2007). As a result, perceptions that members of a group share common structural constraints is the foundation for any form of politicized collective identity.

One form of group identity that has been particularly useful in describing the persistent use of group-based cues by African Americans is the concept of linked fate. According to Dawson (1994), African Americans who perceive their individual fates to be tied to those of their racial group are more likely to rely on group-based interests when they make political decisions. Linked fate has been identified as an explanation for why, despite increasing economic polarization, African Americans remain a relatively cohesive political group. For example, linked fate has been used to explain African Americans near monolithic support for the Democratic Party (Dawson, 1994), as well as their consistent unified positions on public policies and racial attitudes (Hochschild, 1992).

Although the linked fate measure was originally constructed based on the specific experiences of African Americans, recent work suggests that linked fate is present within panethnic communities as well. Masuoka (2006) finds that although a large segment of the Asian American community (46%) does not have perceptions of linked fate with other Asians, linked fate does appear to be meaningful for an equally large segment of the Asian American community. Further, Lien, Conway, and Wong's (2004) examination of the Pilot National Asian American Political Survey found that linked fate increased both voting and non-voting participation for Asian Americans. Furthermore, Masuoka and Sanchez' (2008) analysis of the Latino National Survey reveals that a large segment of the Latino community perceives that their individual fate is not only linked to other Latinos, but that the status of their national origin group is also tied to that of Latinos more generally. This new research suggests the emergence of linked fate in communities beyond the African American population.

Despite the positive impact of group consciousness across several aspects of minority political behavior, our knowledge of how group commonality is formulated is surprisingly limited. In regard to linked fate, it appears as though the mechanisms motivating group identity may vary tremendously by racial/ethnic group. Shared race along with a shared history of unequal treatment in the U.S. serves as the basis for linked fate among African Americans (Dawson, 1994) and, to some extent, Asians (Masuoka, 2006), but these same indicators do not appear to be the driving force behind linked fate for Latinos (Masuoka and Sanchez 2008). Factors associated with the immigration experience, such as nativity and language preference, appear to be the basis for Latino linked fate, with the less assimilated holding stronger perceptions of common fate with other Latinos (Masuoka and Sanchez 2008).

While early work conceptualized linked fate occurring between members of racial and ethnic groups, we are interested in determining whether members of a religious minority group may also view their fates linked to that of the larger religious community. To our knowledge, no study has tested the existence and development of linked fate for members of a religious minority. Given that previous research has found that there are different antecedents to linked fate among various racial and ethnic minority groups, we expect that factors influencing linked fate for Muslims will likely be somewhat unique as well. The following discussion of the Muslim American population will identify potential sources of linked fate for Muslims. These factors include religion, immigration status (nativity, language etc.), and perceptions of discrimination.

The Basis of Linked Fate for Muslim Americans

Given the dearth of demographic data, social scientists have struggled to understand the basic characteristics of the Muslim population residing in the United States. Primarily this challenge is due to the fact that questions regarding religious affiliation are prohibited from inclusion on the U.S. Census. Further, Muslims make up a relative small share of the national population which makes it difficult to draw out a large enough sample in national public opinion surveys (Pew 2007). In fact, the first nationwide academic survey to focus specifically on the Muslim population was not conducted until 2007 by the Pew Research Center. [2] Nonetheless, there are some trends that can be gleaned from extant research that helps to provide some context for our analysis of group consciousness formation.

The Impact of Religious Affiliation on Muslim Group Identity

The role of religion in the lives of Muslim Americans is expected to be highly salient, and as a result provides a major foundation for the potential presence of shared group identity within this community. Most notably, the Islam religion provides two important sources of cultural unity for Muslims: language and religious practice. While Muslims living in the United States may speak a variety of languages, such as English, Arabic, Urdu, Hindi, Farsi, Amharic, Serbian, Indonesian, or Turkish, it is believed that the Prophet Mohammad received his instructions in Arabic, and therefore all prayers, and most religious services are held in Arabic. Thus, although Arabic fluency rates vary dramatically, almost all Muslim Americans have a symbolic bond forged by language.

Second, Muslim religious practices and rituals are unique from those practiced by other major religions in the United States, particularly Christianity. In particular, Muslims share the custom of praying five times daily, always in the direction of Mecca. Further, the holy day for attending the mosque is Friday, where afternoon prayers and participation in the mosque bringing together Muslims of all different backgrounds. And while some religious studies scholars have noted that American religious services are often highly segregated both racially and ethnically (Hadaway, Hacket and Miller 1984), the opposite trend appears to occur at mosques throughout Muslim communities. Though mosques vary by Sunni and Shia tradition, most are extremely diverse, bringing together immigrants from Africa, the Middle East and Asian, as well as native born Muslims, all recognizing each other as part of a larger Muslim community.

---

[2] Prior to the 2007 Pew survey, community-based organizations did conduct episodic surveys of Muslims in America, including Muslim Americans in the Public Square (Project MAPS), and the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR). .

Finally, the religious calendar and holidays differ for Muslims as well, with Eid-al-Adha and Eid-al-Fitr celebrated during the Hajj and Ramadan, which change by a few weeks each year. Islam teaches the value of Ummah, or the sense that Muslims throughout the world are linked and united. Especially in a non-Muslim host society such as the United States, the concept of Ummah encourages the affiliation and connection with other Muslims. This concept offers insight into why Muslims, regardless of their differences in nativity, national origin or language may still perceive a sense of group commonality.

We argue that these factors contribute to a sense of shared identity among Muslims, especially among those living in a majority-Christian society where religious identity has remained salient. In a review of how census categories contribute to group identity, Barreto (2003) argues that “the social constructions of group identification, whether real or not, guide individuals to take their place in a group and act as a member of the group.” While it is more common to apply this paradigm to racial and ethnic populations in the United States, there is evidence that this process is likely to occur among religious groups as well. In fact, writing about religious cleavages in early twentieth century, Herberg (1955) states that religious identity became the default social grouping for American identity. “The way in which one identifies and locates oneself is closely related to how one is identified and located in the larger community,” (Herberg 1955: 25). Herberg’s work provides valuable context for our work here, providing a reminder of the powerful history of religious group identity in the United States.

In fact, some have argued that religion is the defining factor for which all political decisions are made for the Muslim population. For example, according to Lewis (2002), part of the challenge faced by Muslims is that religious practices are not separated from political beliefs because "all problems are so to speak ultimately religious, and all final answers are therefore religious." While we are cautious to accept the notion that Muslims do not distinguish between religion and politics,[3] this argument nonetheless highlights the potential for Islam to provide the basis for a strong degree of group commonality. The role of religion in the lives of the Muslim population may even be stronger in the United States since American political values align closely with many Muslim precepts. Abdul Rauf (2004), an Imam with expert knowledge of Islamic teachings and practices, argues that the principles of equality and the free exercise of religion embedded in American legal and political history, provide Muslims with an open environment to practice their religion.

While religious attachments appear to be salient to the political beliefs of all Muslims, this connection may be heightened for a particular segment of the population. Those with a high sense of religiosity are likely to have a close and personal connection to Islam. They are likely to be the most familiar with Hadith, more likely to regularly read the Qu'ran and regularly attend prayer services at the mosque, and have a strong sense of shared community with other Muslims. This notion is reinforced by the work of Jamal (2005), who finds that Muslims with greater Mosque participation have a

---

[3] Religious scripture states that the Prophet Mohammad instructed his followers to uphold the laws and practices of their host society, even if they should find themselves in a majority non-Muslim state. Thus, Muslims are inclined to engage the political system of their host countries despite maintaining a religious identity.

heightened sense of group consciousness.[4] It is therefore likely that this segment of the Muslim American population will have a heightened sense of linked fate with other Muslims.

The Impact of Migration and Discrimination Experiences on Muslim Group Identity

While religion may serve as the major unifying principal for the Muslim population, Muslim Americans can also be viewed to share a marginalized racial status as a non-white minority group and share common experiences of exclusion as an immigrant group. This multifaceted identity is very similar to that of other populations from earlier periods of American history, such as the Jewish and Catholic American communities in the early 1900s (Goldstein and Goldscheider 1968; Gordon 1964). Jews and Catholics were simultaneously immigrants, minorities, and members of a religious group (Herberg 1955). Today, the same can be said for Muslim Americans. In addition to outlining the relevance of religiosity to Muslim American group identity, it is equally important to analyze how Muslims' experiences in the United States are not only similar to that of other racial and ethnic communities, but how these experiences similarly motivate a sense of linked fate for Muslims.

Although there are Muslims of European heritage in the United States, most are of non-European backgrounds and thus share a marginalized status as non-white racial minorities. However, we recognize that the racial classification of Muslim Americans is extremely complex. A large proportion of the Muslim American population is Arab, which the Census Bureau classifies as racially "White."[5] However, there is reason to believe that Arab Americans are a racialized population. Nadine Naber (2000) explains that the migration of Arabs and Middle Easterners changed from Christian Arabs in the late 19th century to mainly Muslims, especially in the 1960s. This change in migration patterns motivated questions about the "racial" status of Arabs and Muslims in the United States. She writes, "the shift from predominantly Christian to predominantly Muslim immigrants is one of many factors that render the historical question of whether Arab Americans should be considered white/Caucasian or a non-white minority still unresolved." Naber argues that Arab and Muslim Americans are racialized through their religious association as Muslims, and that traditional classifications of race and ethnicity render Arab Americans "invisible" in the United States. Naber's argument is reinforced by public opinion data of the American public, which continually shows that Americans in general view Muslims or Arabs as a non-White population (Kundnani 2007; Park et. al. 2007)

---

[4] Jamal (2005) finds that this relationship does not hold for Muslims from South Asia in her split sample analysis.

[5] This excludes the U.S. born African American Muslim population who comprise approximately 20% of the Muslim population in the United States (Pew 2007).

This paradox is similar to the Latino experience in the United States. Although Latinos have been defined historically as White racially in the United States (Garcia and Sanchez 2008), this community has clearly been viewed by the larger society as a distinct racial and ethnic group. Based on common cultural characteristics, shared migration and discrimination experiences, Latinos have significant perceptions of group identity and commonality (Sanchez 2006; Masuoka and Sanchez 2008; Stokes 2003), and a large segment of the Latino community defines themselves as "some other race" when asked to define themselves racially (Barreto 2003). In the following section we argue that a large segment of the Muslim American population shares the experience of migration to the United States, and has and continues to face significant levels of discrimination. We believe that along with religious affiliation, it is likely that these factors motivate group identity for Muslim Americans just as they have for the Latino population.

Since 9-11, Muslim Americans have been the target of a number of hate crimes and other forms of discrimination arguably due to the interaction between their non-white status and religion. In 2006, Congressman Peter King, then chairman of the Homeland Security committee, called for increased FBI surveillance of all mosques in America to root out terrorism. In 2007, the Council on American Islamic Relations cited data finding increases in the number of hate-crimes against Muslims as compared to 2002 (in the aftermath of 9/11). Most recently, on January 1, 2009 a family of eight Pakistani Americans – including two children under age 8 – was ordered off a commercial flight from New York to Florida because two white teenage girls reported that the Pakistani family was discussing the safety of airplanes. These stories are not be isolated incidents, as recent public opinion data suggest that most Muslim Americans believe that life has become more difficult for Muslims in the United States following 9/11, and many worry about government surveillance, job discrimination, and being harassed in public (Pew, 2007). The Pew study also reports that about one-third of U.S. Muslims have personally experienced discrimination (verbally harassed, physically threatened, or treated with suspicion) because of their faith. When asked to identify the biggest problem facing U.S. Muslims, Muslim respondents the most cited concern was discrimination and prejudice (Pew 2007).

These trends are of particular relevance to this study, as historical and contemporary experiences with discrimination provide the basis for both group commonality and linked fate. Garcia's (2000) "discriminatory-plus" model suggests that common experiences and values among minority group members can lead them to be more receptive to collective political efforts. Scholars have found that perceived discrimination fosters group consciousness among racial and ethnic groups (Bernal & Martinelli 1993; Masuoka 2006; Padilla 1985; Uhlaner 1991) and motivates individuals to participate in politics (de la Garza and Vaughn 1984; Marable, 1985; Stokes 2003; Wong 2003), support policies or candidates that are good for the racial/ethnic group (Dawson 1994; Tate 1993; Uhlaner 1991) and even provides the foundation for coalitions between minority groups (J. Garcia 2000; Kaufmann 2003; Uhlaner 1991).

The research conducted on common or linked fate in the Black politics literature is particularly meaningful to this argument as well. For example, Michael Dawson's (1994) notion of the *black utility heuristic* argues that African Americans infer political self-interests from group interests of African Americans generally. This theory is based upon the historic and continued role of racial discrimination in the Untied States. For Dawson, continuous exposure to racial discrimination makes African Americans more aware of their racial identity, and therefore heightens a sense of linked fate for Blacks. For these reasons we anticipate that perceptions of, and direct exposure to discrimination in the United States will similarly increase perceptions of commonality and linked fate for the Muslim American population. Discrimination against Muslims in the West typically isolates one characteristic as the basis of prejudice: perceived "Muslim-ness." This is irrespective of the different traditions and national origin groups within the Muslim community. Thus, Muslim Americans who view discrimination against their group as problematic are quite likely to side with other members of their Muslim in-group.

Finally, the Muslim American population is comprised largely of immigrants, as roughly two-thirds (65%) of adult Muslim Americans are foreign-born and approximately 40% have come to the U.S. since 1990 (Pew 2007). This is an important point, as scholars have found that nativity and immigration experiences contribute to both group commonality and linked fate among Latinos and Asians (Masuoka and Sanchez 2008; Masuoka 2006; Sanchez 2006a Sanchez 2006b). Given these patterns, we expect that foreign born and non-English dominant Muslims should have a higher perception of outsider status, and therefore be more likely to demonstrate group-based identity.

Data and Methods

To assess the role of religiosity and discrimination on perceptions of group consciousness among Muslim Americans, we implemented a unique public opinion survey in 2007-2008. For this study, we fielded an original survey of Muslim Americans across twelve cities: Dearborn, MI, Seattle, WA, San Diego, CA, Irvine, CA, Riverside, CA, Los Angeles, CA, Raleigh-Durham, NC, Chicago, IL, Dallas, TX, Houston, TX, Washington D.C., and Oklahoma City, OK. The sample represents an incredibly diverse cross-section of American cities and the Muslim population, including interview sites in the East, West, and Midwest, as well as the major Muslim population centers in the U.S. Notably, the Dearborn area is the single largest concentration of Arab and Muslim Americans, and represents a predominantly Arab population which has been established for at least 50 years. Our sample also includes important regions such as Southern California and Chicago which both have sizable African American Muslim populations. Other sites such as Seattle, Oklahoma City, Raleigh, and Washington D.C. add additional medium-sized cities to the sample, each with a unique and diverse Muslim community. Our sample includes large numbers of Arab, Asian, and African American Muslim respondents, making it quite representative of the overall U.S. Muslim population.

The survey was administered in an "exit poll-style" whereby research assistants[6] randomly targeted participants who completed the paper survey on their own. Participants were selected using a traditional skip pattern to randomize recruitment and could chose to answer the survey in English, Arabic, or Farsi. Drawing a random sample of Muslims in the United States is not easy or efficient given their relatively small population. To address this concern, the survey was implemented at randomly selected mosques and Islamic centers across the twelve locales. In total, respondents were interviewed at 22 different locations in the twelve cities. In addition, we gathered a large number of interviews outside the prayer services during Eid al Adha and Eid al Fitr [7]. In total, 1,410 surveys were completed and the demographics of our sample closely match those reported in a recent Pew survey of Muslim Americans[8] (See appendix, Table 1 for sample characteristics).

Although our sample is drawn from religious centers and places of worship, we believe that it represents a wide spectrum of religiosity. Among our full sample, 25% state they are very involved in activities at their mosque, while 13% state they are *not at all* involved (and the remainder in the middle). Further, while exactly 50% of our sample say they follow the Qu’ran and Hadith very much in their daily life, 38% follow only somewhat, and 12% only a little. This ratio is consistent with the Pew survey of Muslim Americans, which was a national telephone survey.

---

[6] Research assistants were predominantly second generation Muslim, most fluent in a second language (Arabic or Urdu) and were balanced between men and women. All research assistants attending a training session, and participated in a pilot survey to ensure consistency and professionalism.

[7] Our survey was in the field from December 30, 2006 to December 9, 2008. Of the 1,410 completed interviews, 373 were collected during Eid al Adha prayers, 726 during Eid al Fitr prayers, and 311 were collected regular Jum'ah prayers. Islamic Eid prayers are similar to religious services for Christmas and Easter Mass. These events attract both religious and secular Muslims since they incorporate religious, cultural and community-building elements into the prayer service (Ba-Yunus 2006).

[8] The Pew survey was conducted by telephone, and went into the field January – March 2007.

Our sampling design and data collection method are also advantageous because we were able to avoid social desirability bias. Because the survey is self-administered and completely anonymous, respondents are far more likely to reveal their true preferences on a range of attitudinal and behavioral questions. Thus, a far higher degree of trust existed than during an impersonal telephone survey where a respondent must state their answers aloud for the interviewer to record. In fact, Presser and Stinson (1998) note that when it comes to asking questions about religion, self-administered surveys deliver far more accurate data than interviewer-administered surveys. We believe this is especially true among Muslim Americans, who face more social pressure than other groups to give “assimilated” responses to survey questions.

Variable Construction

To measure group identity we selected two survey questions commonly utilized in past research. The first is the traditional perception of commonality question found in national surveys such as the National Election Survey and General Social Survey and often included in batteries tapping into group consciousness (Kaufmann 2003; Sanchez 2006a; 2006b): “How much do you think you have in common with other Muslims in the United States?” We believe that this question is an important starting point to determine if, at a general level, Muslims believe they are a collective group. Although religion might be the basis for a sense of shared commonality, the great diversity found within the

Muslim population could mean that Muslims do not believe they are one collective group but rather multiple groups distinguished by sect, national origin, race, and language.

The second question is the linked fate question that has been found to be a key measure for a politicized black group consciousness (Dawson, 1994): “Do you think what happens to other Muslims in this country will affect what happens in your life?” For Dawson, this is a key concept which explains why group identity may persist above and beyond changes in an individual’s socioeconomic status or other dimensions of racial integration. Thus, we use the linked fate along with commonality measures here to determine the degree of group identity across multiple dimensions among Muslims.

Our independent variables can be divided into five dimensions: socio-demographics, race, religion, immigration, and politicization. For the socio-demographic dimension, we include controls for age, gender, education and income, and racial background. Our multivariate models use Arabs as the comparison group and we control for White, Black, Asian and “other” racial group. For the religion dimension, we controlled for the type of religious tradition by including a dummy variable for those who are of the Sunni tradition, and other/secular, as compared to Shi’a. We also included a variable measuring the respondent’s involvement in the mosque which would account for the respondent’s interactions with others of the same faith. Our third religious variable measures personal religiosity and taps into the degree to which the respondent follows the Quran and Hadith in their day-to-day living.

Because a large proportion of Muslims are immigrants, we include a control for immigrant generation, ranging from foreign-born non-citizen, to U.S. born third generation. We also account for the level of social acculturation by including a measure for the primary language spoken in the home, English or something else. Finally, related to assimilation, we control for respondents beliefs about the idea of the ethnic melting pot in America, and whether Muslims should change their culture to blend into larger society. These three measures will allow us to see how ethnic acculturation is related to group consciousness.

Given the emphasis on discrimination in previous research and its hypothesized connection with a politicized group consciousness, we include two measures for perceived discrimination: the opinion that Muslims are unduly targeted at airports and the perception that discrimination against immigrants is a problem in U.S. society. This approach provides the ability to tap into multiple dimensions of discrimination.

Finally, we include two contextual variables related to the demographics of the place of worship to test whether exposure to a more diverse Muslim community increases perceptions of group identity and commonality. We tabulated the demographics of respondents prayer locations to get a sense of how homogenous or diverse each mosque or Eid prayer was. First, we created a measure of location diversity based on the race and immigrant status of the respondents in our survey, which ranged from 0 – 100. A value of zero represents a prayer location in which every respondent we interviewed was of the same race, and of the same immigrant generation (i.e. all Asian and foreign born), whereas higher values represent more diverse demographics. Second, we created a measure of location diversity based on the percent Sunni among our respondents at each location. While this measure also may range from 0 – 100, we folded in the middle category, those with a rating of over 50, so that a location that is 0% Sunni is coded similarly to a location that is 100% Sunni[9] (frequency distribution of both variables can be found in appendix). In contrast, values close to 50% represent those prayer locations which are the most diverse (thus, this measure ranges from 0 – 50).

Findings and Analysis

Before identifying the determinants for each of our group identity measures, we first look at the simple frequencies for each of the two questions. As we present in Table 1, Muslim respondents report a strong sense of group commonality. On the perceptions of commonality question, 44% of the respondents felt that they shared “a great deal” in common with other Muslims compared to the 12% who felt that they shared “nothing” or “only a little.” This corresponds with the distribution on the linked fate question, with 67% of respondents strongly agreeing that their individual fates are linked with other Muslims while only 3% disagreed with the statement. It is clear that despite tremendous diversity, and consistent with our expectations, there is a high level of group identity within the Muslim American population.

[Insert Table 1]

To identify the determinants for both group commonality and linked fate we used ordered logit models to estimate the effects of each form of group identity. Turning first to the commonality model depicted in Table 2, we find evidence that religiosity, discrimination, and diversity are all predictors of Muslim commonality. The religiosity and discrimination findings are in line with our expectations, both being positively correlated with perceptions of commonality for Muslim Americans. These findings are critical to our investigation and will be discussed in more detail below. However, other demographic factor matter as well. While there are no effects for age, gender or income, education increases a sense of shared commonality among Muslims. Whites, the most likely racial group to have converted, are statistically less likely to view commonality, while there is no distinguishable difference between Arabs, Asians, and Blacks. Those who identify as "other" race, where also somewhat less likely to view commonality.

---

[9] This step was taken due to both scenarios not being religiously diverse.

[Insert Table 2]

With respect to religious tradition, we find no statistical difference in shared commonalty attitudes between Shi'a and Sunni, or secular Muslims. For all religious traditions, support for group identity is fairly strong. Our findings suggest that religiosity, specifically religious participation, is a strong contributor to perceptions of commonality. Those who are involved with the mosque more frequently are significantly more likely to report commonality with other Muslims (31% increase) and likewise those with a high degree of personal religious guidance are the most likely to view shared commonality (38% increase).

The acculturation variables show a very interesting pattern that point toward the acculturating effect of group identity. We find that foreign born are less likely to view commonality with other Muslim Americans. As generation in the U.S. increases, Muslim Americans become more likely to view themselves in a shared group context. Interestingly, we also find that there is not a tradeoff between blending into American society and maintaining high feelings of group identity, a pattern consistent with Latino group identity (Fraga et. al 2006). Respondents that support the idea of the melting pot, also support a sense of shared commonality with American Muslims. This finding, taken with those regarding generation, suggests that as Muslims become integrated into

American society they begin to view themselves as a distinct group and are more aware of their minority status and shared commonality with other fellow Muslims.

Perceived discrimination also influences Muslim group identity, though not as significantly as other predictors within the model. Those who view airport security measures uniquely targeted at Muslims, as opposed to all travelers, are about 6% more likely to report a strong sense of commonality. Those who viewed discrimination against immigrants as a problem were not statistically more likely to report commonality. Therefore, we find mixed support for our hypothesis that discrimination experiences would be a driving force behind Muslim group identity. One reason the perceived discrimination variables are not more relevant could be the limited variability in their distribution. For example, 77 percent viewed airport measures as targeting Muslims and 86 percent viewed discrimination against immigrants as a problem.

Finally, we turn to our contextual variables measuring the degree of diversity in the prayer location where the respondent was interviewed. While places of worship are often segregated by race and religious section in America (Hadaway, Hacket and Miller 1984), Muslim prayer centers are not nearly as numerous or neighborhood-based, and thus mosques and Eid prayers can attract a much more diverse Muslim congregation. However, in some parts of the country with a more established Muslim community, we do notice more segregated mosques (for full distribution of our diversity measures see appendix 2). Looking to the results in Table 2, we find that as the racial and immigrant generation diversity of a prayer location increases, so too does the likelihood that a Respondent will report shared commonality with other Muslims. In fact, those who were interviewed in the most diverse settings reported a 14% increase in the probability of having the highest level of commonality. Interestingly, as the prayer location became more religiously diverse – that is a mix of Sunni and non-Sunni followers, there was a negative, though not statistically significant effect on commonality.

We now turn our attention to the determinants of linked fate among Muslim Americans displayed in Table 3. Descriptively, we have reported above high rates of linked fate among American Muslims, even in the presence of great diversity within the community. This segment of our analysis will provide a discussion of what motivates this high level of linked fate. Overall, we find general consistency with the results for the shared commonality model reported in table 2. We believe that this provides evidence that we have a rather comprehensive model of Muslim based group identity. Increases in education lead to higher levels of linked fate, consistent not only with the commonality model, but a widespread finding among African Americans (Dawson 1994; Simien 2005). Here, we find that those with higher education witness a 20% increase in the probability of having very strong linked fate with other Muslims. Also consistent with Simien's work on Blacks, we find age is negative whereby younger Muslim Americans report higher rates of linked fate. However, we do note some differences with respect to race and linked fate within the Muslim community. Compared to the base category of Arab Muslim, Whites, Blacks, and Asians are all more likely to perceive high levels of linked fate, even as Arab Muslims are the single largest group within the community. However, it is important to note that our descriptive statistics indicate that across all racial groups a vast majority of Muslim Americans view a high degree of linked fate.

[Insert Table 3]

Our findings regarding the relationship between linked fate and religiosity mirror those for the commonality model. As mosque involvement and religious guidance increase, so too does a respondent's probability of having the highest level of linked fate. The impact of religious guidance in one's daily life is particularly pronounced, as respondents who are the most religiously devout have a probability of perceiving linked fate at 53% higher than those who are not at all devout. The results for the perceived discrimination measure are also consistent with the commonality model, however we find more significant results in this context ($p<.001$). Those who view airport security measures as targeting Muslims are nearly 12% more likely to strongly view linked fate. Finally, our location diversity measures report analogous results for commonality and linked fate, with religious diversity now reaching statistical significance. Again, as the racial and immigrant diversity increases in a prayer location, so too do feelings of linked fate with other Muslims. However, as the prayer center becomes more diverse across religious tradition (i.e. Sunni, Shi'a) the degree of linked fate falls off by more than 11%. This becomes especially interesting when you consider that at the individual level there is no statistical difference between Sunni and Shi'a views of linked fate. However, to some degree, they may be envisioning linked fate with other Sunni or Shi'a Muslim Americans, and as the mosques becomes more diverse, a strong sense of linked fate declines slightly. This relationship is best depicted in Figure 1, which graphs the predicted probability of reporting strong linked fate as the location's racial or religious diversity increases. The trends in Figure 1 clearly show that increases in racial diversity lead to a higher probability of believing in linked fate with other Muslims. However the opposite trend is found for increases in religious diversity.

[Insert Figure 1]

The ordered logit regression results detailed above paint a picture in which religiosity and place of worship play a crucial role in Muslim American group identity. Across both the shared commonality and the linked fate measures, religious guidance, mosque involvement, and racial diversity at the prayer center mattered greatly. However these components can not be viewed in isolation of one another, but rather, acting in concert to produce an overall effect. Theoretically, we would expect the influence of location diversity to be more pronounced among those more frequently attending or involved at the mosque, whereas those who rarely attend should not be as receptive to the benefits of the location's racial diversity. Thus, we simulated the effects of location racial diversity across different levels of mosque involvement for both of our dependent variables, commonality and linked fate. These results are presented as both a set of four probability panels in figures 2-3, and also point estimates in tables 4-5.

[Insert Figures 2 – 3]

[Insert Tables 4 - 5]

As is evident in the predicted probability panels in figures 2 and 3, as expected mosque involvement and location diversity have a cumulative impact. In instances of low mosque involvement increases in racial diversity have a positive but limited effect. It is when a respondent is actively involved at their place of worship, and that location of worship is racially diverse that the biggest increase is noticed in Muslim group identity. These are two independent variables, that are theoretically related (though not correlated) to one another,[10] and have a combined influence on Muslim American group identity.

---

[10] It is important to note that mosque involvement is not at all correlated with location racial diversity (coef = .0087; p=.7466), so questions of endogeneity or independence are not relevant.

Discussion and Conclusions

The results presented here suggest that while Muslim Americans are a very diverse community, they perceive themselves to be a cohesive religious minority group in the United States. Overall, we find very high levels of shared group commonality and linked fate among Muslim Americans, and consistent patterns of consistency across this diverse group. When compared to other minority groups in the United States, Muslims are arguably the most diverse. Two out of three Muslims are foreign born, and Muslim national origin is rooted in more than 50 countries, with a combined use of more than 30 languages. Furthermore, among the U.S. born population there is a mix of second generation citizens along with African American and Anglo converts to Islam. Despite this great diversity, religion does appear to unite the American Muslim population. We find that the most religiously devout Muslims, as well as those who are most involved at their Mosque are significantly more likely to have perceptions of linked fate and perceptions of group commonality than less religious Muslims.

Most importantly, we find that perceptions of discrimination in the United States influence the formation of Muslim group consciousness. Those who view Muslims as being uniquely targeted by airport security measures do view higher rates of group identity. However, perceptions of discrimination do not appear to be the driving force for the development of a politicized group consciousness, as the results are somewhat less significant, and substantively smaller than the effects of religiosity. Our findings related to the discrimination variable raise new questions regarding the measurement of attitudes and perceptions of racial discrimination. At the same time, the fact that perceived discrimination does play a role is noteworthy for this minority group. Muslims are by definition a religious group, however their place in America has become increasingly racialized over the past decade (Ajrouch and Kusow 2007; Naber 2000; Nagel and Staeheli 2005). That the more traditional race politics variables are predictive of group identity is in itself interesting, and suggests a more complex group identity for Muslims (Ajrouch and Kusow 2007), while also indicating that there are some common predictors of group identity across groups.

Finally, with respect to the racial and religious diversity within the Muslim American community we find very interesting results. Concerning religious affiliation, we find no difference in degree of group consciousness between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims. On average, both tend to have a high degree of shared commonality and linked fate. However, the results for location diversity suggest that group consciousness is not completely transferable across religious tradition. Muslims in the most diverse Sunni-Shi'a prayer locations reported somewhat lower levels of group identity than those who are in more homogenous Sunni majority or Shi'a majority centers. With respect to race, on the one hand, we find Whites are less likely to view commonality, whereas Arabs are less likely to view linked fate. However, there is a steady increase in both shared commonality and linked fate with other Muslims as the place of worship becomes more racially diverse and diverse across immigrant generation. Mosques that have Arab, Asian, Black and White congregations, as well as those with a mix of immigrants and U.S. born, were the most likely to produce respondents with very high levels of shared commonality and linked fate.

Politicized group consciousness is an important concept to scholars of American politics, as this concept has proven crucial to our understanding of political participation and attitudes among African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans. While the relevance of group consciousness to American politics is rather well accepted, the process that produces this key variable is still very much in question. As the Muslim population continues to increase in the United States, and questions of political and social integration of minority groups continue, it is important for scholars to have a handle on determinants of group identity, and this study has offered the first glimpse at this community.

References

Abdul Rauf, Feisal. 2004. *What's right with Islam: a new vision for Muslims and the West*. San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco., page 86.

Ajrouch, Kristine, and Abdi M. Kusow. 2007. "Racial and religious contexts: Situational identities among Lebanese and Somali Muslim immigrants." *Ethnic and Racial Studies.* 30 (Jan) 72-94.

Ba-Yunus, Ilyas & Kassim Kone. 2006. *Muslims in the United States*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Barreto, Matt. 2003. "National Origin (Mis)Identification Among Latinos in the 2000 Census: The Growth of the "Other Hispanic or Latino" Category." *Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy.* 15 (June): 39-63.

Bernal, M., Knight, G.P., Garza, C., Ocampo, K.A. & Costa, M.K. 1990. "The Development of Ethnic Identity in Mexican-American Children." *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences*. 12: 3-24.

Dawson, Michael C. 1994. *Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

de la Garza, Rodolfo, and David Vaughan. 1984. "The Political Socialization of Chicano Elites: A Generational Approach." *Social Science Quarterly* 65(2):290-307.

Fraga, LR., Garcia, J.A., Hero, R., Jones-Correa, M., Martinez-Ebers, V, Segura, G.M. 2006. "*Su Casa Es Nuestra Casa*: Latino Politics Research and the Development of American Political Science." *American Political Science Review.* 100(4): 515-522.

Garcia, John. A. 2000. "The Latino and African American Communities: Bases for Coalition Formation and Political Action." In G. Jaynes (Ed.), *Immigration and Race: New Challenges for American Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

------------------. 2003. *Latino Politics in America: Community, Culture, and Interests*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefiled Publishers, Inc.

Goldstein, S. and C. Goldscheider. 1968. *Jewish Americans: Three Generations in a Jewish Community*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.

Gordon, Milton M. 1964. Assimilation in American Life. The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hadaway, C. Kirk, David G. Hackett, and James F. Miller. 1984. "The Most Segregated Institution: Correlates of Interracial Church Participation." *Review of Religious Research*. 25: 204-220.

Herberg, Will. 1955. *Catholic – Protestant – Jew*. New York: Doubleday & Co.

Hochschild, Jennifer. 1995. *Facing up the American Dream: Race, Class and the Soul of the Nation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Jamal, Amaney. 2005."The Political Participation and Engagement of Muslim Americans: Mosque Involvement and Group Consciousness," *American Politics Research,* Vol. 33, No. 4: 521-544.

Kaufmann, Karen. 2003. "Cracks in the Rainbow: Group Commonality as a Basis for Latino and African-American Political Coalitions." *Political Research Quarterly.* 56: 199-210.

Kundnani, Arun. 2007. Integrationism: The Politics of Anti-Muslim Racism. *Race and Class.* 48(4): 24-44.

Leighley, Jan. 2001. *Strength in Numbers?: The Political Mobilization of Racial and Ethnic Minorities*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lewis, Bernard. 2002. *What went wrong?: Western impact and Middle Eastern response*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lien, Pei-te, M. Margaret Conway, and Janelle Wong. 2004. *The Politics of Asian Americans: Diversity and Community.* New York: Routledge.

Manzano, Sylvia and Gabriel Sanchez. 2006. "Take One for The Team: Ethnic Identity, Candidate Qualification and Co-Ethnic Voting." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. September.

Marable, Manning. 1985. *Black American Politics: From the Washington Marches to Jesse Jackson*. (London: Verso).

Masuoka, Natalie. 2006. "Together They Become One: Examining the Predictors of Panethnic Group Consciousness Among Asian Americans and Latinos." Social Science Quarterly. 87: 993-1011.

Masuoka, Natalie and Gabriel Sanchez. 2008. "Brown Utility Heursitic? The Presence and Contributing Factors of Latino Linked Fate. Paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting. Chicago, IL. April.

Miller, A.H., Gurin, P., Gurin, G., & Malanchuk, O. 1981. "Group Consciousness and Political Participation," *American Journal of Political Science.* 25: 494-511.

Naber, Nadine 2000. "Ambiguous insiders: An investigation of Arab American 'invisibility'." *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. 23(1): 37-61

Nagel, Caroline R. and Lynn A. Staeheli. 2005. "'We're just like the Irish': Narratives of Assimilation, Belonging and Citizenship Amongst Arab-American Activist." *Citizenship Studies*. 9 (Nov): 485-498.

Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Padilla, Felix. 1985. *Latino Ethnic Consciousness: The Case of Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans in Chicago*. University of Notre Dame Press. Notre Dame, Indiana.

Park, Jaihyun, Karla Felix and Grace Lee. 2007. Implicit attitudes toward Arab-Muslims and the Moderating Effects of Social Information. *Basic and Applied Social Pyschology*. 29(1): 35-45.

Pew Research Center Report. "Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream." May 22, 2007.

Presser, Stanley and Linda Stinson. 1998. "Data Collection Mode and Social Desirability Bias in Self-Reported Religious Attendance." *American Sociological Review*. 63: pp. 137-145.

Ricourt, M. & Danta, R. 2003. *Hispanas de Queens: Latino Panethnicity in a New York City Neighborhood.* Cornell University Press: Ithaca and London.

Sanchez, Gabriel. 2006a. "The Role of Group Cohesion In Political Participation Among Latinos in The United States." *American Politics Research.* 34: 427-450.

------------. 2006b. "The Role of Group Consciousness in Latino Public Opinion." *Political Research Quarterly*. 59: 435-446.

Simien, Evelyn. 2005. "Race, Gender, and Linked Fate." *Journal of Black Studies*. 35: 529-550.

Stokes, Atiya Kai. 2003. "Latino Group Consciousness and Political Participation." *American Politics Research*, 31, 361-378.

Tate, Katherine.1994. *From Protest to Politics The New Black Voters in American Elections*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Uhlaner, Carole. 1991. "Perceived Prejudice and Coalitional Prospects among Black, Latinos, and Asian Americans." In Byron Jackson and Michael Preston (eds), *Ethnic and Racial Politics in California* (pp. 339-71). Berkeley, CA: Institute for Governmental Studies.

Verba, Sidney and Norman Nie. 1972. *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality*. New York: Harper and Row.

Wong, J. S. (2003). Gender and Political Participation among Asian Americans. Asian American Politics/Rowman and Littlefield.

Tables

Table 1. Group Identity Distributions

Commonality		
"How much do you think you have in common with other Muslims living in the United States?"		
Nothing	19	1%
Only A Little	154	11%
A Fair Amount	599	43%
A Great Deal	613	44%
Total	*1,385*	*100%*
Linked Fate		
"Do you think what happens to Muslims in this country will affect what happens in your life?"		
No	45	3%
Yes, a little	419	30%
Yes, a lot	921	67%
Total	*1,385*	*100%*

Table 2: Determinants of Commonality with other Muslims

Independent variables	Beta	Std. Err.		Chg PP[11] Highest value
Age	0.0413	0.0823		3.0%
Education	0.1596	0.0582	**	15.1%
Female	0.0083	0.1188		0.2%
Income	0.0505	0.0368		6.1%
White	-0.6162	0.2643	*	-14.1%
Black	-0.0609	0.2064		-1.5%
Asian	-0.0476	0.1484		-1.2%
Other Race	-0.4083	0.2440	†	-9.6%
Sunni	-0.0535	0.2288		-1.3%
Secular/Other	-0.3198	0.2596		-7.7%
Mosque Involvement	0.4492	0.0669	***	31.2%
Religious Guidance	0.6248	0.0936	***	37.7%
Immig generation	0.2616	0.1041	**	12.9%
English at home	0.0955	0.0924		4.6%
Melting pot	0.2042	0.0596	***	14.7%
Airport discrimination	0.2441	0.1466	†	5.9%
Discrim ag immigrants	0.0594	0.0887		2.9%
Location diversity: race & nativity	0.0062	0.0027	*	13.8%
Location diversity: Sunni/Shi'a	-0.0077	0.0061		-8.1%
Cut 1	0.7480	0.5632		
Cut 2	3.4148	0.5102		
Cut 3	5.9853	0.5337		
N	1,228			
Adj R-sq	.072			
PPC	.581			
PRE	.242			

*** p < .001   p < .010   p < .050   † p < .100

Dependent variable: “How much do you think you have in common with other Muslims living in the United States?” 1=Nothing; 2=Only a little; 3=A fair amount; 4=A great deal

---

[11] Change in predicted probability that the dependent variable will take on the highest value, “a great deal” in common, when the independent variables moves from it’s minimum to maximum value

Table 3: Determinants of Linked Fate with other Muslims

Independent variables	Beta	Std. Err.		Chg PP[12] Highest value
Age	-0.1768	(0.0936)	†	-11.8%
Education	0.2228	(0.0648)	***	20.0%
Female	0.1896	(0.1350)		4.0%
Income	0.0591	(0.0423)		6.3%
White	0.6178	(0.3275)	†	11.8%
Black	0.9983	(0.2479)	***	18.3%
Asian	0.3822	(0.1737)	*	8.0%
Other Race	-0.3380	(0.2671)		-7.6%
Sunni	-0.2618	(0.2494)		-5.5%
Secular/Other	-0.7904	(0.2810)	**	-18.2%
Mosque Involvement	0.1992	(0.0747)	**	13.0%
Religious Guidance	0.8000	(0.1051)	***	53.6%
Immig generation	-0.1207	(0.1198)		-5.3%
English at home	0.1799	(0.1044)	†	7.8%
Melting pot	0.0342	(0.0696)		2.2%
Airport discrimination	0.5178	(0.1621)	***	11.6%
Discrim ag immigrants	0.0818	(0.0996)		3.5%
Location diversity: race & nativity	0.0078	(0.0031)	*	16.2%
Location diversity: Sunni/Shi'a	-0.0123	(0.0068)	†	-11.1%
Cut 1	0.9864	(0.5647)		
Cut 2	4.1878	(0.5678)		
N	1,229			
Adj R-sq	.093			
PPC	.716			
PRE	.101			

*** $p < .001$ $p < .010$ $p < .050$ † $p < .100$

Dependent variable: “Do you think what happens to Muslims in this country will affect what happens in your life?” 1=No; 2=Yes, a little; 3=Yes, a lot

---

[12] Change in predicted probability that the dependent variable will take on the highest value, “Yes, a lot” see fate linked, when the independent variables moves from it’s minimum to maximum value

Figure 1: Probability of Reporting A lot of Linked Fate with Other Muslims
Effect of prayer location diversity on linked fate



Figure 2: Probability of Reporting Great Deal in Common with Other Muslims
As prayer location racial diversity increases from 0 – 100
(Each panel is different level of mosque involvement)



Table 4a: Predicted Probability of a great deal in common with other Muslims

		Mosque Involvement			
		None	Little	Some	A lot
Prayer location racial diversity	Lowest	19%	26%	36%	47%
	Med-Low	21%	29%	39%	51%
	Medium	24%	33%	43%	54%
	Med-High	27%	36%	47%	58%
	Highest	30%	40%	51%	62%

Figure 3: Probability of Reporting A lot of Linked Fate with Other Muslims
As prayer location racial diversity increases from 0 – 100
(Each panel is different level of mosque involvement)



Table 4b: Predicted Probability of a highest belief in linked fate

		Mosque Involvement			
		None	Little	Some	A lot
Prayer location racial diversity	Lowest	49%	54%	59%	64%
	Med-Low	54%	59%	64%	68%
	Medium	59%	63%	68%	72%
	Med-High	63%	68%	72%	76%
	Highest	68%	72%	76%	79%

Appendix 1

TableA1: Construction of variables in analysis

Dependent Variables	
Commonality	1=None; 2=A little; 3=Some; 4=A great deal
Linked fate	1=No; 2=Yes, a little; 3=Yes, a lot
Group index	Combined scale of commonality and linked fate, standardized 0-1 index
Independent Variables	
Age	1=18 to 29; 2=30 to 44; 3=45 to 65; 4=over 65
Education	1=less than HS; 2=HS grad; 3=Some College; 4=College grad; 5=Graduate degree
Female	dummy variable, 1=Female
Income	1=less $20K; 2=$20-39K; 3=$40-59K; 4=$60-79K; 5=$80-100K; 6=Over $100K
White	dummy variable, 1=White race
Black	dummy variable, 1=Black race
Asian	dummy variable, 1=Asian race
Other Race	dummy variable, 1=Some other race
Sunni	dummy variable, 1=Sunni
Other Muslim	dummy variable, 1=Other/Secular
Mosque involvement	1=not at all involved; 2=not too involved; 3=somewhat involved; 4=very involved
Religious guidance	How much follow Qu'ran/Hadith in daily life 1=not at all; 2=only a little; 3=somewhat; 4=very much
Generation	0=Foreign non-citizen; 1=Foreign citizen; 2=US born second; 3=US born third
English	Language at home: 1=Mostly Not English; 2=Mix of both; 3=Mostly English
Melting pot	Blend into America: 1=Not at all; 2=Not much; 3=Somewhat; 4=Very important
Airport discrimination	0=Security measures target all Americans equally; 1=Targeted at Muslims
Discrim against Immig	0=Not really; 1=Somewhat; 2=Very much
Location diversity	Racial / Immigrant diversity 0=Homogenous; 100=Highest degree heterogenous
Location diversity	Religious tradition diversity 0=Entirely Sunni or Shi'a; 50=50/50 mix of both

Appendix 2: Frequency distribution of relevant variables




Distribution of Location Racial Diversity variable
% of all cases
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Location Racial Diversity


Distribution of Location Religious Diversity variable
% of all cases
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
0-10
10-20
20-25
25-30
30-40
40-50
Location Religious Diversity